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Many consumer choices require predictions of partner's product attitudes. It 
has been shown that for some product categories, people might lack relevant partner 
knowledge. We investigate the cognitive processes underlying consumers' prediction 
of their partner's product attitudes when relevant partner information is available. In 
the present studies the relevant partner information is provided in the form of online 
feedback. A first study reveals that mere awareness one is predicting the partner's 
attitudes actually hurts accuracy when similarity is low. In follow-up studies we 
examine the underlying reasons and generalizability of the obtained results. - 3 -
A couple leaves the furniture store quarreling because she hates the black 
leather upholstery that he wants for the recliner seat they had agreed to buy. A man 
buys his Florida football fan boyfriend white Gator socks that he will never wear. A 
girl gets an expensive Gwen Stefani haircut because her fiance loves No Doubt, only 
to find out that he likes the music but not the looks of the singer. Smoothly occurring 
joint decisions by partners, gift buying, or even accountable personal decisions by 
relationship partners typically require that each understands the relevant preferences 
of the significant other. 
Over the last few decades, research studying the purchase of products for joint 
use (e.g. Davis 1976) observed a shift to more egalitarianism between partners and 
more influence of the wife's attitudes for previously husband dominated purchases. In 
addition, scarcity of time has led to increasing delegation of purchase decisions to one 
of the partners (e.g. Belch and Willis 2001; Cunningham and Green 1974; Qualls 
1982; Scazoni 1977). The importance of accurate prediction of partners' product 
preferences has increased correspondingly. Since close relationships provide many 
opportunities to gather information on the partner's product attitudes and how they 
differ from the own attitudes, one might expect that partners should be able to 
accurately predict each other's product preferences. However, one only needs to 
complete a 'Know your partner' test in a popular magazine to learn that it is not 
always so easy. 
Sometimes spouses assume similar product attitudes when in fact they disagree. 
In this case, attitude discussion before the buying decision is unlikely and this can 
lead either to unpleasant surprises at the time of purchase, or silent compliance and 
conflict avoidance by one of the partners. At other times partners may assume that 
their product attitudes differ when they actually do not. This misperception very likely 
leads to miscommunication, and again, may result in dissatisfaction of at least one 
partner (Kenny and Acitelli 1989). In this article we look at the sources of accuracy 
and inaccuracy of this prediction process. - 4-
PREDICTION PROCESS 
When consumers already have pre-stored knowledge of the partner's attitude 
towards a product, they simply have to retrieve that knowledge from memory (Hoch 
1984). In many other situations however, the partners lack pre-stored knowledge of 
each other's product attitude. Hence, they will have to predict the other's attitude on 
the basis of other available cues. A commonly used cue is one's own attitude towards 
the product. Ross, Green and Haus (1977) found that people tend to project their own 
beliefs, attributes, and behaviors on others. A wife, who would like to possess a PDA 
or handheld PC, might buy one for her spouse assuming her husband holds a similar 
attitude. Many times replicated, this phenomenon is known as the 'false consensus 
effect' (see Marks and Miller 1987, for a review). 
However, consumers have additional sources of information for inferring the 
partner's product preferences. First, they may rely on base rate and stereotypical 
information about the partner, like the gender, age and professional categories the 
partner belongs to. Since her husband belongs to the category of busy business people, 
where handheld computers symbolize professionalism, the wife might infer a PDA to 
be a suitable birthday present. Second, people also possess partner-specific 
knowledge, which may consist of general information about the partner (such as 
personality traits), attitudes towards similar products, feedback received during prior 
product discussions, or observations of the partner's purchasing behavior. The spouse 
might infer her partners preference for a PDA because she knows him as a very 
organized person, or because she knows his liking for electronic equipment like 
laptops and cellular phones. When predicting their partner's attitudes, then, people 
can both use their own attitudes and whatever information they have beyond their own 
attitudes (Davis, Hoch and Ragsdale 1986), as presented in the figure below. The 
prediction model in figure 1 is consistent with Kenny and Acitelli (2001), who 
decompose the overall obtained prediction accuracy into a direct effect due to the use 
of other information and an indirect effect due to projection. -5-
Insert figure 1 about here 
We are aware of only one prior study directly examining how accurate 
consumers are in predicting the partner's product preferences (Davis et al. 1986), 
which produced rather disappointing results: only 53 percent of the respondents were 
able to outperform a hypothetical forecaster who simply predicted the average gender-
specific preference for each product. This finding comports with related research in 
social psychology on the accuracy of inferences about partner beliefs and personality 
traits, also suggesting that general accuracy is quite low. Swann and Gill (1997), for 
instance, found in both a cross-sectional and a longitudinal study that neither 
relationship length nor relationship involvement increases the accuracy in predicting 
partner's preferences. Also Kenny (1994, 2002) concludes that at best prediction 
accuracy increases early in the relationship but improves little after, if at all. 
What is behind these low levels of accuracy? Low prediction accuracy may be 
due to inaccurate information cues or incorrect weighing of the cues (Hoch 1988). 
Applied to the two prediction cues people use when predicting the spouse's attitudes, 
three major sources of inaccuracy can be identified. First, there may be errors of 
projection if people can not reliably retrieve their own attitudes that serve as anchors, 
like when attitude similarity among the alternatives is high, or when personal attitudes 
are strongly influenced by the context in which they are retrieved (Davis et a!. 1986). 
Second, people may hold invalid information about the partner. They can 
receive false feedback due to "white" lies or when they are withheld negative 
feedback in order to avoid conflict (Davis et al. 1986). False feedback may result in 
the formation of incorrect prediction rules about the other's preferences, and 
inaccurate future predictions. People also tend to underestimate situational factors that 
have influenced observed behavior by the partner (Dunning et al. 1990) and, as a 
consequence, the inferred partner attitudes may be invalid for prediction in other 
situations. Attitudes can also change over time. Once couples feel that they know 
particular product preferences of  each other, they may stop paying much attention to 
them, and consequently fail to update currently held beliefs when the partner's -6-
attitudes change (Kenny and Acitelly 2001). And finally, even if most of the huge 
amount of information partners have about each other would be correct, it will also be 
irrelevant to any specific prediction task at hand, and might cloud the identification of 
relevant information. Inability to distinguish diagnostic from non-diagnostic 
information may put an extra burden on prediction accuracy. 
Finally, most research on prediction errors has however focused on the weight 
people give to each type of prediction cue. One view is that people should not put any 
weight on their own attitudes. Many false consensus researchers have explained 
prediction inaccuracy by the inability to disregard own attitudes when predicting those 
of someone else. Others have noted that attitude projection can lead to accuracy 
because for many attitudes partners are actually quite similar to each other (Hoch 
1987; Kenny and Acitelli 2001). Although some data on projection phenomena in the 
relationship domain show that partners adapt their level of projection to the actual 
similarity, partners also have a general tendency to assume more similarity than there 
really is. Davis et al. (1986), for instance, found that for 93 % of the participants who 
predicted their partner's product preferences the level of projection exceeded actual 
similarity. There are strong indications that the information of the partner is confused 
with the self (Aron et al.  1991), but also that partners are additionally motivated to 
ignore dissimilarities when perceiving the partner (Ickes and Simpson 1997). 
Nevertheless, the study by Davis et al. (1986) revealed that most participants would 
have increased accuracy by projecting even more. This remarkable finding indicates 
that if partners reduce the reliance on the own attitudes, another burden arises: they 
also seem to have difficulties in identifying relevant partner information beyond the 
own attitudes. 
One reason for this difficulty may be the unavailability of relevant partner 
information. For the Davis et al. (1986) study, this explanation seems plausible. They 
used new futuristic products (at that time), such as an electric-powered automobile, a 
pop-top can for canned vegetables and a rental service for oil paintings and 
lithographs.  Presumably relevant partner information on attitudes towards these 
specific products was sparse. By consequence, the own attitudes were indeed the best 
information the partners possessed. In this case partners can relatively easily 
overcome the other-information deficit by gathering information relevant to the -7-
prediction task at hand, for example by discussing the product category. West (1996), 
for instance, found that people provided with the target's actual attitude towards some 
product alternatives, were quickly able to appropriately project and increase the 
validity of the other information cue in subsequent predictions. 
A more fundamental problem however would arise to the extent that partners 
possess (or are provided with) valid other information, but for some reason fail to use 
it. The present series of studies is therefore designed to find out what happens when 
people are presented with such relevant other information, like their actual partners' 
attitudes. 
We distinguish three possible reasons why partners (compared to strangers) 
can be expected to behave suboptimally. First, in close relationships partners typically 
have access to an extensive knowledge base about one another. We assume that each 
partner can activate a significant amount of partner-specific information from this 
broad knowledge base. We suspect that this activated information will impede good 
predictions of their partner's product attitudes. This is because the partner information 
is often invalid (e.g., Davis et al. 1986; Dunning et al. 1990) and because most of the 
information partners have about each other is irrelevant to the prediction task at hand 
(Swann and Gill 1997). In short, we expect that prior partner information will 
interfere with the more diagnostic new attitude information and eventually lead to 
suboptimal use of  the other information cue. 
Although the degree of own attitude projection will probably be related to the 
actual level of attitude similarity, we still expect that overall partners will assume high 
similarity. Therefore they will stick to their own attitudes even if valid other 
information is provided (Schul and Vinokur 2000). In other words, we expect partners 
to be more prone to incorrect weighting of  the prediction cues. 
Finally we also expect that people predicting their partner's attitudes, might be 
overconfident. Miscalibration can be a major barrier to information search and 
sensitivity (Alba and Hutchinson 2000). Research on the calibration of spousal 
attitude prediction is sparse. Yet, the existing findings point in the same direction and 
are consistent with intuition: spouses are overconfident when predicting the other's 
preferences. Swann and Gill (1997) found that people were overconfident in assessing 
their partner's current preferences. This confirms earlier findings that people in - 8-
general are overconfident in judging their peers (Dunning et al. 1990). More 
interestingly, Swann and Gill (1997) showed that overconfidence was directly related 
to both relationship involvement and relationship length. The main reason for this 
miscalibration in couples is that accuracy perceptions are often based on salient but 
nondiagnostic cues such as familiarity with the target and representational richness of 
the target (Swann and Gill 1997), which are both high for couples. In sum, couples 
might perceive themselves as better predictors of each other's attitudes than they 
really are. By consequence overconfidence might be an additional explanation for 
why partners, although presented with valid cues, fail to be accurate predictors. 
With this article, we also attempt to make a methodological contribution. Until 
now, most cross-sectional studies compared partners with strangers to investigate the 
effect of partner knowledge. This may lead to incorrect conclusions. Finding a 
different result for a group of partners compared to a group of total strangers might 
not (solely) be due to the acquaintance factor but to underlying differing 
characteristics of the two groups. These differences can consist of either personal 
differences (people involved in a relationship may differ from singles) or differences 
in characteristics of the predictor-target dyad. For example, people typically associate 
themselves with similar others (Buss 1985), which leads to higher average similarity 
among partners than among strangers. We try to remedy this shortcoming by keeping 
the target (i.e. the partner) constant and manipulating the awareness that one is 
predicting the partner's attitudes. 
STUDYl 
In this  first  study  we  investigate  whether  people  have  indeed  difficulties 
predicting their partner's product attitudes in a situation where feedback is available. 
We also hope to identify the underlying reason(s). To this end, we will take a closer 
look at (1) the effect of other information compared to the own attitudes on prediction 
accuracy, (2) the amount of projection and (3) the degree of miscalibration. - 9-
Method 
Stimuli.  We compiled a  heterogeneous  set  of 30 different  bedroom images 
from furniture store catalogs, interior decoration magazines, and internet sites to serve 
as  product alternatives.  Each alternative consisted of a picture of the  bedroom, the 
brand name (e.g.,  Vannes,  Cerenna,  ...  ),  a description of the set-up (e.g.,  bed,  two 
bedside tables and dresser), the finishing (e.g., cherry, rattan, ...  ), and the price. The 
stimuli were scanned from catalogs or downloaded from the internet to be presented 
on a color computer monitor. This product category was chosen because we assumed 
that the participants  did not  have  pre-stored  attitudes  of their  partner towards  the 
presented bedroom sets. 
Procedure and Design.  Local graduate and undergraduate students who were 
in a relationship for at least six months were invited to the laboratory together with 
their partner. Thirty-seven couples participated. They had been dating for seven to 61 
months with an average relationship length of 29 months. The couples were paid € 12 
for their participation. 
Participants took place in individual cubicles, equipped with a computer on 
which the entire experiment was conducted. All instructions were displayed on the 
computer screen. First they were asked to provide their own attitude (by choosing 
'positive' or 'negative') towards each of the 30 bedrooms presented. Order of 
presentation was the same for all participants. 
The individual participants were randomly assigned to either the partner 
condition or the stranger condition. We told them that we wanted to find out how well 
people could predict the attitudes of their partner versus those of a complete stranger 
and that, to this end, some would have to predict the attitudes of their partner (= 
partner condition) while others would predict the attitudes of a 'person X', an 
unidentified prior participant (= stranger condition). Next, the same 30 bedrooms were 
presented, in the same sequence as before. The respondents in the partner condition 
had to predict their partner's attitude ('positive' or 'negative') towards each product 
and to indicate their confidence level (0 to 100%) for that prediction. Immediately 
after each judgment, feedback about the actual attitude ('positive' or 'negative') of 
their partner towards the same bedroom was provided. The participants in the stranger 
condition went through exactly the same procedure but predicted the attitudes of and - 10-
received feedback on 'person X'. In reality, they received feedback on the actual 
attitudes elicited from their partners. 
We conducted an ANOV  A with two between-subjects variables: (1) condition 
(partner vs. stranger), and (2) similarity (low vs. high similars). Similarity was 
calculated as the phi-coefficient between the predictor's and the partner's actual 
attitudes. A median split was performed on the phi coefficients (median =  .19). 
Respondents with a similarity higher than the median are referred to as  'high 
similars' , the other respondents are defined as  'low similars'. The dependent variables 
are: (1) prediction accuracy, (2) amount of projection, and (3) calibration. Below, we 
will discuss the results with respect to each of these variables. 
Accuracy. We calculated prediction accuracy as the phi-coefficient between 
prediction and partner's actual attitudel . High similars (M<p =  .42) are more accurate 
than low similars (M<p =  .14) (F(l, 66) =  40.7, p < .0001).  The main effect of 
feedback condition was only marginally significant (F(l, 66) = 3.08, P < .09), but the 
condition effect interacts significantly with similarity (FO, 66) =  4.50, P < .04). The 
interaction is depicted in panel A of figure 2. Post hoc analyses Tukey HSD revealed 
that our expectation of lower accuracy of respondents in the partner condition 
compared to those in the stranger condition only holds for the low similars. For high 
similars this difference disappears. 
Insert figure 2 about here 
1 For this and subsequent studies we also computed the absolute accuracy as the 
number of correct answers, and a sensitivity measure based on signal detection theory 
(McNicol 1972). The results for these two measures were always consistent with 
those based on the relative accuracy, and therefore they are not discussed in this 
paper. - 11 -
For a more profound analysis, we decomposed the total accuracy score based 
on Kenny and Acitelli (2001). They proposed that the accuracy component caused by 
projection can be calculated as the product of the amount of projection2 and actual 
similarity. Intuitively, this means that when partners have identical attitudes, 
projecting the own attitudes will lead to full accuracy. On the other hand, when 
partners hold opposite attitudes, projection will lead to complete inaccuracy. Also, 
when similarity is low, projection can have only a limited effect on total prediction 
accuracy. The part induced by other information then is the total accuracy score minus 
the projection component. We ran a 2 x 2 ANOVA on both components separately. 
For the accuracy caused by projection, we found a significant main effect of similarity 
(F(l, 66) = 84.29, p < .0001). Panel B in figure 2 shows that the accuracy due to 
projection is larger for high than for low similars. However, knowing that one is 
dealing with the partner does not influence the effect of projection on accuracy. For 
accuracy induced by other information, we found a significant interaction between 
similarity and condition (F(l, 66) =  1l.04, P < .01), depicted in panel C of figure 2. 
Post hoc  Tukey HSD comparisons revealed that for high similars awareness did not 
effect the contribution of other information on accuracy. Low similars, however, were 
less accurate in predicting the attitudes of their partner, and this was due to inferior 
use of other information. 
Projection. As anticipated, high similars (M~ = .33) projected significantly 
more than low similars (M~ = .47) (F(1, 66) = 5.79, p < .02). This indicates that the 
respondents were able to adapt their level of projection to their actual level of 
similarity, consistent with West (1996). Moreover we find this effect irrespective of 
the condition they belonged to: respondents did not project more when predicting 
their partner than when predicting person X. Higher levels of assumed similarity with 
the partner are typically found on issues that are more central to the relationship 
2 The amount of projection is measured as the path-coefficient represented in figure l. 
Mathematically, the amount of projection is obtained by the following formula: 
[corr(own attitudes, prediction) - corr(own attitudes, partner's 
attitudes  )*corr(prediction, partner's attitudes]/[l-corr(  own attitudes, partner's 
attitudes  )2]. - 12-
(Kenny and Acitelli 2001). It is possible then that people in general do not assume 
higher similarity with their partner for this particular product category. 
Calibration. Since we have an independent and valid indicator of prediction 
accuracy (i.e. the actual attitude of the partner), we use the valid indicator paradigm to 
assess calibration (Alba and Hutchinson 2000). According to this paradigm, 
calibration can be defined as the extent to which confidence is a valid indicator of 
accuracy, as measured by the point biserial correlation between confidence and 
prediction accuracy over product alternatives. We found a significant effect of 
similarity (F(I, 66) =  8.38, p < .01) indicating that, although the level of calibration is 
rather low, high similars (Mr =  .28) are better able to adapt their confidence to their 
actual accuracy level than low similars (Mr =  .15). No condition effect is found. 
Respondents in the partner condition are neither worse nor better calibrated than those 
in the stranger condition. 
Discussion 
People who are aware they are predicting the attitudes of their partner did not 
outperform people who do not have this information. On the contrary, when similarity 
in product attitudes is low, people predicting the attitudes of their partner performed 
worse than those predicting an alleged stranger. Our results suggest that the 
inaccuracy is due to the use of incorrect or irrelevant other information activated by 
the mere awareness one is predicting the preferences of one's own partner. Apart from 
the provided feedback, people in the stranger condition could only rely on very 
general base-rate, or even stereotypical, knowledge. While not very informative, this 
information was also less misleading. In this sense the stranger condition is an 
appropriate benchmark to investigate the sources of inaccuracy in spousal attitude 
prediction. 
When similarity is high, the negative effect of partner-specific information 
disappears. This corresponds to the finding of Hoch (1987) that spouses who are more 
similar are better able to capitalize on relevant partner knowledge than spouses who 
are less similar. Also, we found that people significantly increased their level of 
projection when similarity is high. By consequence, other information beyond the - 13 -
own attitudes has a weaker effect on accuracy, possibly explaining why no difference 
is found for high similars. 
We found no projection or calibration differences between partner and 
stranger condition. The observed accuracy difference can not be explained by the fact 
that people aware they are predicting their partner's attitudes overestimate attitude 
similarity or their prediction abilities. 
STUDY 2 
A first explanation for the accuracy difference observed in study 1 is that 
partner specific information could have a lower prior predictive value than the base 
rate and stereotypical information people use when predicting a total stranger. A 
second possibility is that the partner knowledge interferes with the new attitude 
information, such that people have more difficulties updating the information they 
have about their partner than about a stranger. With the second study we intended to 
extract the most viable explanation by manipulating the availability of feedback. 
When no feedback is provided, respondents can only base their prediction on their 
own attitudes and prior target knowledge. 
Method 
Couples that had been together for at least six months were invited to 
participate in this study. They were contacted through student email listings. Eighty-
four couples, acquainted for six to 72 months with an average of 26 months, 
responded and received a reward of € 12 per couple. All participants were included in 
the analyses. 
As in study 1 the procedure consisted of two phases. In the first phase, all 
respondents rated ('positive' or 'negative') the same 30 bedrooms we had used in 
study 1. Rating order was randomized. In a second phase, they were asked to predict 
the attitudes of either their partner or the unknown person X towards the bedrooms. In 
reality both groups predicted the product attitudes of their partner. Each time the 
participants were asked to indicate their confidence level (0 to 100%). Half of the 
respondents received the actual attitude of their partner after each prediction and half - 14-
of them obtained no feedback at all. Together with similarity (low vs. high similars) 
this results in a 2 x 2 x 2 between-subjects design. As in study 1, we conducted 
ANOV  As for accuracy, projection and calibration. 
Results 
Accuracy. Apart from a main effect of similarity (F(l, 159) =  228.75, P < 
.0001), we found a significant condition x similarity x feedback interaction (F(l, 159) 
=  39.573, P <.05), shown in panel A of figure 3. In the feedback condition, we found a 
significant condition x similarity interaction (F(l, 77) = 7.76, p < .01). When 
similarity is low, respondents in the stranger condition are more accurate than those in 
the partner condition (F(I, 77) = 9.19, p < .01). This difference is not observed when 
similarity is high (F(l, 77) =  .90, p > .34). This confirms our findings of study 1. In 
the no feedback condition, however, there is only a main effect of similarity (F(I, 82) 
=  13.20, P < .001). Respondents with highly similar attitudes are more accurate than 
those with less similar attitudes, but we observed no differences between the partner 
and stranger condition. 
Insert figure 3 about here 
As in study I, we decomposed the total accuracy level, revealing a main effect 
of similarity on the accuracy component due to the use of own attitudes (F(I, 159) = 
92.51, p < .0001). As can be seen in panel B of figure 3, for high similars the accuracy 
caused by projecting the own attitudes is higher than for low similars. With respect to 
the accuracy component based on other information (panel C of figure 3), the results 
show a condition x similarity interaction when feedback is provided (F(l, 77) =  5.38, 
p < .03), but no significant effects when there is no feedback. When feedback is 
displayed, the results indicate that the accuracy component caused by other target 
information is higher in the stranger than in the partner condition when similarity is 
low (F(I, 77) = 10.21, P < .01). If similarity is high this difference disappears (F(I, 
77) = .02, P > .88). Again, this is in accordance with study 1. - 15 -
Projection. The only effect found on the amount of projection is a marginally 
significant effect of similarity (F(I, 159) = 3.53, p < .07). Similar to study 1, 
respondents with highly similar attitudes (M[3 =  .42) tend to project more compared 
with the low similars (MI3 =  .35). 
Calibration. With respect to calibration, all three main effects were significant. 
Like in study 1, high similars (Mr = .20) are better calibrated than low similars (Mr = 
.12) (F(l, 159) = 7.50, P < .01). Also receiving feedback (Mr =  .19), compared with 
not obtaining feedback (Mr =  .12), seems to help the respondents match their 
confidence and accuracy levels (F(I, 159) =  6.21, P < .02). Unlike study 1, we also 
found a significant effect of condition (F(1, 159) =  8.70, P < .01). Contrary to 
expectation calibration was higher when respondents were aware the target was there 
partner (Mr = .21) compared with not being aware of this (Mr =  .12). No interactions 
were observed. 
Discussion 
When we look at the conditions were no feedback about the partner's attitude 
was provided and hence participants could only rely on prior target knowledge, we 
found no  significant  accuracy  differences  between  partner  and  stranger condition. 
This confirms our expectation that prior knowledge validity is not the main prediction 
burden. Moreover, the findings show that low similars who aware they are predicting 
the attitudes of their partner, face problems updating their prior partner knowledge. 
Consistent with studyl, this also confirms that the use of other information beyond the 
own attitudes, and not the level of projection or calibration, is the main prediction 
burden partners face. 
STUDY 3 
Aim and Expectations 
With this study we want to find out whether the obtained learning differences 
of study 1 and 2 are due to a difference in encoding or retrieval of the provided 
feedback. A first possible explanation is that people, encountering information of their 
partner's attitudes, fail to encode it or do so in a biased manner. Studies have shown - 16-
that people tend to encode information that is consistent with prior knowledge, 
thereby avoiding inconsistent and assimilating ambiguous information (Taylor and 
Crocker 1981; Srull and Wyer 1979). On the other hand, prior knowledge about the 
target is also found to have positive effects on encoding. Cohen (1981), for example, 
found that prior knowledge about a person allowed people to be more accurate at 
recognizing consistent, but also inconsistent information, probably because new 
information that violates prior beliefs is more salient and by consequence processed 
deeper and remembered well (Hastie 1984; Srull, Lichtenstein and Rothbart 1985). 
An alternative explanation is that people encode information of their partner's 
attitudes at least as well as that of a stranger, but they retrieve other, less valid, 
information at the time of prediction. People already posses an extensive amount of 
information about their relationship partner, decreasing the probability that partners 
will retrieve the recently encoded feedback when predicting. In addition, partners 
probably already have well established prediction rules. These rules, based on many 
previous observations, are not very easily changed on the basis of the few instances of 
feedback received during the learning phase. 
Since we expect that prior partner knowledge has both negative and positive 
influences on the storage of new information, we do not expect encoding to be the 
main burden in learning from feedback. We rather predict that the differences between 
partner and stranger conditions are mainly caused by retrieval biases that people 
encounter when predicting the attitudes of their partner. 
With this study, we also want to investigate to what extent our findings can be 
replicated in another learning environment, i.e. an observational task instead of the 
prediction task used in the previous studies (similar to Broniarczyk and Alba 1994). It 
is not only a more realistic and less involving, but also a more limited learning 
environment than the prediction-learning task. In the latter, people not only receive 
information about the prediction target, but also about the validity of their prediction 
strategy itself. 
Method 
One hundred fourteen couples, acquainted for at least six months, participated 
in this study. The participants had been together for on average 26 months with a - 17 -
minimum of six and a maximum of 89 months. Two participants were excluded from 
the analyses because the computer failed to store their responses. We used the 
bedroom stimuli of the previous studies, but we added 30 more bedrooms. These 60 
stimuli were randomly divided in two sets of 30. 
After providing their own attitudes towards 60 bedrooms, the respondents 
were asked to learn the target's attitudes on a first set of 30 bedrooms followed by a 
prediction test on a second set. The bedroom sets were counterbalanced and the 
presentation order within each set was randomized. In the learning task, the 
respondents were required either to predict or just observe the attitudes of the target. 
In the prediction task, the participants had to predict the target's bedroom attitudes 
and after each prediction they received feedback on the actual attitude of the target. 
Respondents in the observation task were immediately provided with the target's 
attitudes towards a specific bedroom. To proceed to the next bedroom, they had to 
click on one out of two buttons corresponding with the target's attitude ('positive' or 
'negative'), which ensured that they would read the feedback. During the prediction 
test, all respondents predicted their partner's attitudes on the remaining 30 product 
alternatives. No feedback about the actual attitudes was provided. Like Cohen (1981), 
we attempted to disentangle encoding from retrieval by manipulating the moment the 
target is identified as the partner: before the learning task (= pre-learning awareness 
condition), after the learning task but before the prediction task (= post-learning 
awareness condition), or not at all (= control condition). Until the moment of 
identification we asked the participants to learn or predict the attitudes of an unknown 
person X, who was in reality also the partner. For respondents in the pre-learning 
awareness condition, the effect of prior partner knowledge should affect both 
encoding and retrieval processes. Participants in the post-learning awareness 
condition were still exposed to the effect of partner knowledge on retrieval of 
information when predicting. Target awareness should have no influence in the 
control condition where respondents remained unaware that the target is their partner. 
After the prediction test, the respondents were given a memory test. They were asked 
to remember the target's attitude on 15 randomly chosen alternatives out of the 30 
bedrooms they saw in the learning task. They could answer with 'positive', 'negative' 
and 'no idea'. - 18 -
This study has a 3 x 2 x 2 between-subjects design. The first variable is the 
moment the target is identified as the partner: before the learning task, after the 
learning task but before the prediction task, or not at all. A second variable is the type 
of learning task: prediction versus observational task. Finally, we again include 
similarity (high vs. low similars) in the analyses. 
Accuracy. Next to the positive effect of similarity on prediction accuracy (MCjJ 
=  .32 for high simi lars vs.  MCjJ =  .16 for low simi  lars) (F(l, 214) =  39.62, p < .0001), 
we also obtained the expected main effect of timing (F(l, 214) = 5.89, p < .01). As 
shown in panel A of figure 4, we found that respondents in both the pre-learning (F(l, 
214)  =  11.21, P < .001)  and  post-learning  (F(l, 214)  = 5.66, p  < .02)  awareness 
condition are less accurate compared to those in the control condition. No difference 
is observed between pre-Ieaming and post-learning awareness conditions (F(l, 214) = 
1.03, P > .31). This favors our prediction that not encoding but retrieval is the reason 
why partner awareness hurts prediction accuracy. 
We also found a marginal effect of the type of learning task (F(1,214) = 3.75, 
p  <  .06).  As  expected,  respondents  learning  from  a  prediction  task  (MCjJ  = .26) 
performed better on  the  prediction  test than  those  learning from  the  more  limited 
observation task (MCjJ  = .21). Type of learning task did not interact significantly with 
the other variables. 
Insert figure 4 about here 
With respect to the amount of accuracy obtained by using the own attitudes, 
we found, next to the straightforward main effect of similarity (F(l, 214) = 131,22, p 
< .0001), also a main effect of timing (F(l, 214) =  5.47, p < .01; see panel B offigure 
4) and a marginal effect of leaming task (F(l, 214) = 3.67,p < 0.06). Post hoc Tukey 
HSD analyses revealed that the amount of accuracy caused by projection is lower for 
the respondents in the control condition compared to those in the pre- or post-learning 
awareness condition. People who learned their partner's attitudes by predicting (<p = - 19-
.08) them had a higher level of accuracy caused by projecting their own attitudes (cp = 
.06). 
Next, the analyses on the accuracy amount due to other information revealed 
the expected effect of timing (see panel C of figure 4). Respondents in the control 
condition were able to attain a higher level of accuracy using other information than 
those in the pre-learning awareness condition (F(l, 214) =  22.09,p < .0001) and also 
more accurate than those in the post-learning condition (F(l, 214) =  15.30, p < .0001). 
Again, being informed that the target is the partner before or after the learning task 
did not influence their amount of accuracy caused by the other information (F(l, 214) 
=  1.11, p > .29). This indicates that not encoding but retrieval of other information 
beyond the own attitudes is the main prediction burden. 
Projection. The analyses on projection revealed a main effect of similarity 
(F(l, 214) =  22.24, p < .0001), indicating that also in this study people were able to 
adjust their amount of projection to their actual similarity (Mil =  .42 for high vs. Mil = 
.28 for low similars). Second, we also found a main effect of timing (F(I, 214) =  9.76, 
p < .0001). Post hoc Tukey HSD analyses learned us that in the pre- and post-learning 
awareness conditions (Mil = .39 for both conditions) the amount of projection is 
higher than in the control condition (Mil = .26). This could explain why the level of 
accuracy due to projection is higher for these respondents compared to the control 
condition. 
Calibration. The only significant effect we obtained is a main effect of 
similarity (F(I, 214) =  22.07, p < .0001). The confidence level of the high similars 
(Mr =  .25) corresponds better to their actual accuracy level than that of the low 
similars (Mr =  14). 
Memory test. The only effect found with respect to how many product 
attitudes the respondents could correctly remember was a main effect of learning task 
(F(l, 213 )= 27.87,p < .0001). People who observed the attitudes when learning (M = 
9.98) remembered more attitudes correctly than those doing a prediction task (M = 
11.29). No differences were observed as a function of when the true identity of the 
target was revealed. If the moment of target identification would affect encoding, then 
a difference in attitude memory should be expected. These results additionally support 
that the previously received attitude information is present in memory, independent of the awareness that the target is in fact the partner. By consequence, encoding is 
unlikely to be the main reason for the found accuracy differences 
Discussion 
- 20-
The findings of this study suggest that, as expected, retrieval of information is 
the major burden partners face when predicting each other's product attitudes. No 
effect of target awareness was observed on the encoding of the provided information 
about the partner. Next to a higher use of their own attitudes, leading to a 
straightforward higher proportion of accuracy due to projection, those aware they 
were predicting the partner's attitudes retrieved less valuable other cues overall 
resulting in less accurate predictions. More generally, we can conclude that the low 
prediction accuracy of partners, found in other studies, is not because partners are not 
able to encode the relevant prediction cues, but because they fail to retrieve them at 
the time of prediction, independent of whether learning consists of active prediction or 
passive observation. 
STUDY 4 
Aim and expectation 
Our previous studies indicate that elaborate knowledge base about the partner 
causes difficulties in retrieving valid information at prediction time. If  this elaborate 
knowledge is indeed the underlying reason, we should find similar results in other 
interpersonal contexts where many possible prediction cues about the target are 
available. In this fourth and final study, we perform a direct test of the effect of vivid, 
but not necessarily valid, information on prediction process. We expect that when 
people possess a lot of information about someone, this information will cause 
retrieval deficiencies and will ultimately result in lower accuracy than when this prior 
target knowledge had not been available. 
Method 
One hundred and sixty-one local students received a € 7 participation fee for 
this study. They were invited to the laboratory in groups of maximum eight. Again, - 21  -
the entire study took place on a computer in individual cubicles. In the first phase we 
asked them to give their own attitudes towards the 30 bedrooms we also used in study 
1 and 2. In the second phase, the participants were randomly divided in two 
conditions. In one condition we asked the participants to predict the attitudes of a 
famous male singer and television personality towards the bedrooms. More 
specifically, we told them that the celebrity was willing to cooperate in our study by 
providing us with his bedroom attitudes. We also added a small biography with his 
main accomplishments and current projects. In the other condition, participants also 
had to predict the attitudes of a famous person, but they were told that we had to keep 
his identity secret. Nonetheless, we asked them to predict his attitudes as accurately as 
possible. Finally, half of the participants were informed that they would receive the 
actual attitude of the celebrity after each prediction. The other half did not receive any 
information about the bedroom attitudes. 
In reality however, all participants predicted bedroom preferences of the first 
author of this article. Also in the feedback conditions, the presented attitudes actually 
belonged to the author. We expect that when the celebrity is identified an elaborate 
amount of vivid, but not necessarily valid, information will be activated about him. 
When the famous person is not identified, participants are expected to activate a much 
more limited information base. 
This results in a 2 x 2 x 2 between-subjects design with the first variable being 
target identification. The prediction target was either identified (= celebrity condition) 
or not (= stranger condition), respectively leading to the activation of elaborate versus 
limited target knowledge. We also manipulated if the participants received feedback 
or not and we again divided the participants in low versus high similars. 
Results 
Accuracy. Apart from a significant main effect of similarity, again indicating 
that high similars perform better than low similars, we found a significant condition x 
feedback interaction, as shown in panel A of figure 5. When no feedback was 
provided prior celebrity information had no positive or negative effect on the 
prediction accuracy (F(l, 188) =  1.72, p > .19). When feedback was provided, 
however, people predicting the attitudes of the identified celebrity performed - 22-
significantly worse than those predicting the attitudes of the unidentified person (F(l, 
188) = 4.09, p < .05). When comparing the feedback with the no feedback condition, 
the data show that people could take significant advantage of the information they 
received when the identity of the famous person was kept secret (F(l, 188) =  6.16, p < 
.02). When the identity was known, the feedback had no effect on the accuracy level 
(F(l, 188) =  .56, p > .45). 
With respect to the accuracy component due to projecting the own attitudes, 
we find the significant main effect of similarity (F(l, 189) =  138.57, p < .0001). As 
usual, the amount of accuracy due to projection is higher for the high similars than for 
the low similars (see panel B of figure 5). More interesting is the significant condition 
by feedback interaction (F(l, 189) = 5.62, p < .02) on the other information 
component as depicted in panel C of figure 5. Similar to the total accuracy measure, 
the data reveal that both conditions perform equally when no feedback is provided. 
(F(l, 189) =  1.87, p > .17). The participants in the stranger condition were able take 
significantly more advantage out of their other information compared to those in the 
celebrity condition when feedback is available (F(l, 189) = 4.45, p < .04). In other 
words, the feedback had a positive effect on the other information component in the 
stranger condition (F(l, 189) = 6.03, p < .02), but not in the celebrity condition (F(l, 
189) = .84, p > .36). 
Projection. No difference in the amount of projection between the celebrity 
and stranger condition is observed. The only marginally significant effect is the main 
effect of similarity (F(1,189) =  3.81 ,p < .06). High similars (Mf) =  .42) projected 
more than the low similars (Mf) =  .36). 
Calibration. We also observed no significant difference in overconfidence 
between the celebrity and stranger condition. Again, a significant main effect of 
similarity was found (F(l,186) =  9.75, p < .01). Participants who had attitudes similar 
to the prediction target (Mr = .18) were better calibrated than those with less similar 
attitudes (Mr =  .lO). 
Discussion 
This study extends our findings beyond the partner context. When people try 
to predict someone's product attitudes, they might encounter difficulties in applying - 23-
new prediction cues just because they already have a lot of information about that 
person.  Additionally, the results of this  study provide us  with  more direct evidence 
that  the  previously  observed  prediction  deficiencies  partners  experience  are  very 
likely caused by their vivid partner specific information. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The real difficulty in predicting the partner's product attitudes is due to the 
suboptimal use of new attitude information. Analogous to 'blocking' phenomena in 
other domains (e.g., van Osselaer and Alba 2000), our participants were not able to 
take full advantage of the provided information concerning the partner's product 
attitudes. More specifically, our findings reveal that, although people encode the 
information about their partner as well as about a stranger, they retrieve fewer valid 
cues at the time of prediction. The wife considering a birthday gift for her husband 
may take into consideration that her husband is a busy business person, consequently 
predicting that he will react positively towards a PDA. Although stored in her 
memory and extremely relevant to the decision task at hand, she might loose sight of 
the fact that he dislikes complicated technological products. In short, partner 
knowledge is found to interfere with additional information concerning the partner's 
product attitudes. This comports with previous studies indicating that other 
information is the main problem when predicting the partner's attitudes and therefore 
should project more (Davis et al.  1986; Hoch 1987). It should be noted though that in 
our studies sometimes participants did project more when predicting their partner's 
compared to a stranger's attitudes, but this could not compensate for the ineffective 
use of other information. Maybe instead of projecting more, partners should be 
encouraged to evaluate the diagnosticity of the information they retrieve about each 
other. 
Based on our findings, one might be inclined to conclude that partner 
knowledge in general has negative effect on prediction accuracy. We would like to 
qualify this. When no external information about the partner's product attitudes is 
available, partner specific knowledge might actually lead to better predictions. Partner 
knowledge can be expected to have a positive effect on accuracy to the extent that - 24-
relevant instances of behavior were previously observed, the product attitudes were 
communicated, the attributes are objective etc. This might explain why some prior 
studies concluded that partners are poor predictors of the partner's attitudes (e.g., 
Davis et al. 1986; Swann and Gill 1997) and other studies found that partner's are 
good predictors (e.g., Funder and Colvin 1988). 
Obviously further research is also needed to explore the generalizability of 
these results. For instance, we worked with relatively recent and inexperienced 
couples. We predict, however, that our findings will a forteriori hold for partners who 
are involved in a relationship for a longer period. Relationship length has been found 
to lead to an increasing amount of partner knowledge and, consequently, higherlevels 
of overconfidence when predicting each other's attitudes (Swann and Gill 1997). 
Although a more extended pool of prediction cues will be available to the predictor, 
the motivation to learn from additional information might be expected to decrease and 
the retrieval of the most relevant prediction cues will become a more complicated 
task. In other words, the impact of new information concerning the partner's product 
attitudes is expected to further decrease with relationship length. 
Our results were replicated in two different learning environments, both devoid of 
physical contact or communication. Although a lot of partner information is learned 
through observation, future research could examine the extendibility of our results in a 
face-to-face setting, where verbal and visual information exchange is possible. Studies 
on empathic accuracy showed that partners have a higher ability to infer each other's 
thoughts and feelings (Hancock & Ickes 1996) and that they communicate more 
efficiently (Ellis &  Hamilton 1985) than strangers. By consequence, it could be 
expected that this communication advantage might to some extent alleviate the 
previously found learning burden. 
Finally, our data also extend prior consumer research on the optimistic side: 
similarity in attitudes outweighs to a large extent the retrieval disadvantages due to 
partner knowledge. The literature suggests that similarity with respect to important 
aspects of life (ideology, values, ...  ) is an important determinant of both partner 
choice and relationship success (Buss, 1985). In this sense, successful couples may be 
shielded from dramatic mistakes by the very similarity that brought and keeps them 
together. Nevertheless partners cannot be similar with respect to the innumerable - 25 -
specific preferences that drive decisions in everyday consumer life. Moreover, 
particularly in these situations where similarity is low, feedback provides an important 
source of information. So, while the prediction inadequacies that we studied may be a 
source of everyday nuisance rather than domestic drama, the importance of 
documenting them remains. - 26-
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FIGURE 3 
DECOMPOSITION OF THE INTERATION BETWEEN SIMILARITY, CONDITION AND FEEDBACK 
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